Socioeconomic inequality of diabetes patients' health care utilization in Denmark by Sortsø, Camilla et al.
Syddansk Universitet
Socioeconomic inequality of diabetes patients' health care utilization in Denmark
Sortsø, Camilla; Lauridsen, Jørgen Trankjær; Emneus, Martha; Green, Anders; Jensen, Peter
Bjødstrup
Published in:
Health Economics Review
DOI:
10.1186/s13561-017-0155-5
Publication date:
2017
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license
CC BY
Citation for pulished version (APA):
Sortsø, C., Lauridsen, J., Emneus, M., Green, A., & Jensen, P. B. (2017). Socioeconomic inequality of diabetes
patients' health care utilization in Denmark. Health Economics Review, 7, [21]. DOI: 10.1186/s13561-017-0155-5
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. Aug. 2017
RESEARCH Open Access
Socioeconomic inequality of diabetes
patients’ health care utilization in Denmark
Camilla Sortsø1,2, Jørgen Lauridsen1* , Martha Emneus2, Anders Green2,3 and Peter Bjødstrup Jensen2
Abstract
Understanding socioeconomic inequalities in health care is critical for achieving health equity. The aim of this paper
is threefold: 1) to quantify inequality in diabetes health care service utilization; 2) to understand determinants of
these inequalities in relation to socio-demographic and clinical morbidity factors; and 3) to compare the empirical
outcome of using income level and educational level as proxies for Socio Economic Status (SES).
Data on the entire Danish population of diabetes patients in 2011 (N = 318,729) were applied. Patients’ unique
personal identification number enabled individual patient data from several national registers to be linked. A
concentration index approach with decomposition into contributing factors was applied. Differences in diabetes
patients’ health care utilization patterns suggest that use of services differ among patients of lower and higher SES,
despite the Danish universal health care system. Especially, out-patient services, rehabilitation and specialists in
primary care show different utilization patterns according to SES. Comparison of the empirical outcome from using
educational level and income level as proxy for patients’ SES indicate important differences in inequality estimates.
While income, alike other measures of labor market attachment, to a certain extent is explained by morbidity and
thus endogenous, education is more decisive for patients’ ability to take advantage of the more specialized services
provided in a universal health care system.
JEL Classifications: I10, I12, I14, I18
Background
Persistent differences in health by socio-economic status
(SES) have long been a serious health policy concern in
many European countries [9, 10, 43]. Evidence on the
contributing factors to inequality in health in general
and disease specific inequality may guide future efforts
to reduce unequal distributions of for instance health
care [9, 10]. This study presents – to our knowledge -
first time evidence on the composition of socioeconomic
inequality in diabetes patients’ health care utilization
patterns.
Diabetes Mellitus is one of contemporary time’s most
burdensome chronic diseases [52]. It is well known that
socio-economic inequality exists in diabetes with higher
incidence and mortality among lower socio-economic
groups [1, 4, 18, 25, 31, 37]. Despite universal coverage
health care systems, social inequalities have been evi-
denced in most European countries [43]. Several Danish
reports have underlined that large differences exist in
compliance to treatment, especially preventive efforts
and retention of life style changes among chronic
patients [11–13]. Access to health care, hence, is not
only a question of equal potential access, as in a univer-
sal health care system like the Danish. The concept of
“realized access” [20] reflects patients’ actual use of the
available services. In health care systems with universal
coverage, realized access may be constrained by financial
and organizational barriers to the use of benefits, such
as required co-payments or other out-of-pocket
payments, restrictions on specialty referrals, or lack of
proximity to health care facilities [20]. Differences in use
of health care within patient groups of same need pro-
vide insight into patients’ ability to take advantage of the
services provided in a universal health care system. Such
knowledge can guide future effort to increase success of
* Correspondence: jtl@sam.sdu.dk
1Centre of Health Economics Research (COHERE), Department of Business
and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5s30
Odense M, Denmark
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Sortsø et al. Health Economics Review  (2017) 7:21 
DOI 10.1186/s13561-017-0155-5
early detection, secondary prevention and treatment.
This is highly important, not only for patients’ quality
and length of life, but also for societies to control the
costs of the increasing diabetes populations [21, 38].
Several studies have assessed the level of socioeco-
nomic inequalities in health using concentration indices
and concentration curves [33, 43, 44, 47]. Taking advan-
tage of the detailed Danish registers, we apply data on
individual patient level on all Danish diabetes patients
[41]. We have previously documented that diabetes pa-
tients of lower SES experience higher morbidity and
mortality [39, 40]. Access to comprehensive data on pa-
tients’ morbidity patterns is unique, allowing for investi-
gation of novel associations between SES, morbidity and
health care utilization patterns investigating the inquiry
whether patients’ health care usage reflects their need
defined through morbidity.
The present study sets out three research inquiries 1)
to quantify socioeconomic inequality in diabetes health
care and pharmaceutical usage (reflected through cost
accounts), 2) to decompose these inequalities by quanti-
fying the contribution attributable to individual
demographic determinants and individual morbidity
characteristics, and 3) to compare the empirical outcome
from using educational level versus income level as
proxy for patients’ SES. Thus, the outline of the paper is
as follows. Next to this introduction, Section 2 briefly
presents the econometric methods applied. Following
this, Section 3 describes data collection and preparation,
while the results are presented in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 provides a discussion of the results, while
Section 6 rounds off with concluding remarks.
Methods
Similar to previous studies initiated by Wagstaff et al.
[49] we use the concentration index as our measure of
relative socioeconomic inequality in healthcare costs. A
concentration curve L(s) plots the cumulative proportion
of the population (ranked by socioeconomic status
(SES), beginning with lowest SES) against the cumulative
proportion of costs. If L(s) coincides with the diagonal
everyone is equally off. However, if L(s) lies below the di-
agonal, then inequality in healthcare costs exists and fa-
vors those with high SES. The further L(s) lies from the
diagonal, the larger the degree of inequality. The con-
centration index, C, is defined as twice the area between
L(s) and the diagonal and takes a value of 0, when every-
one is equally off regardless of SES. The minimum and
maximum values of C are −1 and +1, respectively; these
occur in the (hypothetical) situation where costs are
concentrated in the hand of the least disadvantaged and
the most disadvantaged person, respectively. Thus, the
larger negative value of C, the more costs concentrate
among low SES groups. A computational formula for C
was given by Kakwani et al. [27] as C ¼ 2Nμ
XN
i¼1
yiRi−1 ,
where μ ¼ 1N
XN
i¼1
yi is the mean of observed costs, N the
sample size, yi observed costs, and Ri the fractional rank
defined according to Kakwani et al. as Ri ¼ i−1N þ 12. Fol-
lowing the same authors, C can be conveniently com-
puted as the covariance of yi and Ri, i.e.
C ¼ 2μ covw yi;Rið Þ ¼ 2Nμ
XN
i¼1
yi−μð Þ Ri−
1
2
 
.
A straightforward way of decomposing the predicted
degree of inequality into the contributions of explana-
tory factors was proposed by Wagstaff et al. [48]. Adapt-
ing their approach to the present case, we use a
traditional linear regression that links healthcare costs to
the determinants, leading to a decomposition of the con-
centration index of predicted costs as C^ ¼
X
k
βkxk
μ^
Ck ,
where μ^ is the mean of predicted costs, xk the mean of
the determinant xk, and Ck the concentration index of xk
(defined analogously to C).
In order to assess sampling variability and to obtain
standard errors for the estimated quantities, in particular
for the concentration indices and the contributions, i.e.
the βkxkμ^ Ck parts, we apply a “bootstrap” procedure
([14];) in a four-step manner much similar to van Door-
slaer et al. [44]: First, a random sub-sample of the size of
the original sample is drawn with replacement. Second, the
entire set of calculations, as specified above, are performed
on this sample. Third, this whole process is repeated 1,000
times, each leading to replicate estimates. Fourth, using the
obtained 1,000 replicates, standard deviations and t statis-
tics can be computed for all calculated quantities.
Data
The study is part of the Diabetes Impact Study 2013 [21,
22, 38–40]. Data was collected from the Danish National
Diabetes Register (NDR) [6], the Danish National Patient
Register [34], the Danish National Prescription Registry
[29], the Danish National Health Service Register [3],
the Danish Civil Registration System [5], and social reg-
isters at Statistics Denmark (SD).
The study population covers all patients registered in
NDR diagnosed before 1st of January 2012 and alive 1st
of January 2011, described in detail elsewhere (1), leaving
N = 318,729 patients. The analytical time is a window of
one calendar year (2011) in a cross-sectional design.
This design does not by definition allow for causational
conclusions over time to be drawn, but it enables identi-
fication of differences between groups and hence cost
pattern exploration [26].
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The variables for the study may conveniently be
grouped in three overall groups: Patients SES and demo-
graphic characteristics; health care usage, and patients’
need for health care.
Patients’ socioeconomic, demographic and morbid-
ity characteristics are summarized and described in de-
tails in Table 1. Patients’ annual gross income is applied
as ranking variable, since this measure is the most com-
mon measure of SES in the literature analysing inequal-
ity through concentration indices [43–45]. Several
studies, including those mentioned here, use household
rather than individual income, given that the former is a
more comprehensive expression of the patients’ eco-
nomic abilities. Household information, including house-
hold income, was not included in the present study.
Furthermore, patients’ highest attained educational level,
based on the Danish Educational Nomenclatura with 13
educational groups, is applied as ranking variable as well,
since this measure is frequently used in public health lit-
erature due to its simplicity and universality [19]. When
education is used as a ranking variable, the full nine level
definition is used, and otherwise a three level definition.
Following what has been used in previous studies, in-
cluded demographic variables are age, gender, ethnicity
(Dane, immigrant or descendant), civil status (married/
partnership, unmarried, widowed/longest living partner
or divorced/separated), region of residence, degree of
urbanity of residence, and labour market status (un-
employed, early retired, retired, not in job for other rea-
sons). Finally, relevant and available morbidity
characteristics were added, including incidence in 2011,
complication group (CG0, CG1 or CG2) and mortality
(alive or not in 2011) measures. Alike what has been dis-
cussed elsewhere, there may be endogeneity problems
connected to in particular labour market status, as this
affects not only health but also income rank. However,
we expect the endogeneity problems to be less profound
when using education as SES measure, given that educa-
tion is taken relatively early in the life course and thus
precedes present labour market status.
Turning to health care usage, overall volume of treat-
ment related health care, including pharmaceuticals, re-
ceived by the individual patient, are approximated by the
costs of these services through hospital and health insur-
ance statements. This implies that number or type of
services is not considered but merely total costs by sec-
tors. Measurements of health care and pharmaceutical
consumption in the categories defined, as well as choices
of appropriate cost units, are described in details in
Table 2. Specifically, a total of nine health care cost com-
ponents were available, made up of three components
summarizing hospital inpatient care (total inpatient ser-
vices, inpatient services for stays longer than the average
patient in the Diagnosis Related Grouping (DRG) group,
and inpatient services for rehabilitation), three compo-
nents summarizing outpatient care (total outpatient ser-
vices, outpatient services for stays longer than the
average patient in the DRG group, and outpatient ser-
vices for rehabilitation), two components summarizing
primary care (services in general practices and services
for privately practising specialists), and one component
summarizing prescribed pharmaceutical consumption.
Patients’ need for health care should ideally be mea-
sured by health care professionals’ clinical assessment of
the individual patient. Unfortunately, such data are
unavailable, and instead we apply clinically defined mor-
bidity patterns to proxy patients’ need. Patients are
classified into three complication groups (complication
group 0 – CG0, complication group 1 – CG1, and com-
plication group 2 – CG2), according to the progression
of their diabetes. While CG0 indicates patients without
registered complications, CG1 covers those with moder-
ate or minor problems, and CG2 those with severe com-
plications; see Table 3 and Green et al. [21] for details.
Results
Table 4 presents concentration indices using income as
ranking variable. Contributions of socioeconomic, demo-
graphic and morbidity determinants to the predicted in-
equality (the former in percentage of the latter) is
presented as well. As income is used as ranking variable,
education serves as a control variable only, and thus is
applied in the simpler three categories version. Regres-
sion coefficients and concentration indices for each of
the determinants are given in Table 7 in Appendix.
Overall, the magnitudes of the figures in the table are
modest, reflecting the Danish universal health care sys-
tem with equal access to treatment [50]. Observed and
predicted concentration indices for most of the cost var-
iables are negative meaning that costs concentrate
among patients of lower income groups. This is illus-
trated in Fig. 1, where concentration indices to the left
are interpreted as costs accumulating among lower SES
groups, while the right-side contributions are interpreted
reversely.
In the decomposition analysis, we included patients’
morbidity patterns, degree of complications at time of
analysis, and whether the patient was diagnosed or died
in the current year (2011). Ideally, patients’ morbidity
patterns should explain inequality in the distribution of
health care costs, if costs were allocated exactly accord-
ing to patients’ need. This, of course, is an unrealistic
expectation, since morbidity indicators cannot capture
patients’ exact need, and since costs of services cannot
proxy the exact received number of services needed.
From Fig. 1 it is clear that especially in-patient health
care services inhibit inequality, favoring patients with
lower incomes. This corresponds well to these patients
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experiencing higher morbidity and mortality [39, 40].
Looking at the decomposition of inequality for in-
patient care, (Fig. 2), it is seen that morbidity patterns
explain a large part of predicted inequality. Especially,
the morbidity indicators severe complications at time of
analysis and death in 2011 have marked influences on
Table 1 Definition of socioeconomic, sociodemographic and morbidity characteristics
Characteristics Definitions Categories
Socioeconomics
Highest educational level attained Highest educational level attained at date of data extraction, based
on the main groups in the Danish educational Nomenclature with 13
educational groups based on years of education.
Variable with 3 or 9 categories:
1) Primary education (<11 years)
2) Middle high education (11 to 15 years
3) Higher education (16+ years)
1) Primary education
2) Upper secondary education
3) Vocational education and training
4) Qualifying educational programmes
5) Short cycle higher education
6) Vocational bachelor’s education
7) Bachelor programmes
8) Master programmes
9) PhD programmes
Income level Annual gross income 2011 (DKK)
Demographics
Gender Gender 1) Male
2) Female
Age Age in mid-year Continuous
Civil status Marital status 1) Married or in civil partnership
2) Unmarried
3) Widow or longest living partner
4) Divorced or cancelled partnership
Ethnicity Based on registrations in the Central Person Register 2011. 1) Ethnic Dane
2) Immigrant
3) Descendant
Region of residence Residence 2011 in relation to the five Danish regions 1) ”Capital Region of Denmark”
2) ”Region Zealand”
3) ”Region of Southern Denmark”
4) “Central Denmark Region”
5) “North Denmark Region”
Urbanity Residence in type of geographic area in relation to urbanity 1) City
2) Suburbs
3) Outer areas/country side
Occupational status Affiliation to the labour market 1) Affiliated to the labour market
(employed or self-employed)
2) Unemployed (maternal leave, job
seeker allowance)
3) Unemployed (unemployment benefit)
4) Education
5) Early retirement
6) Retired
7) Child
Morbidity
Incident 2011 Patient diagnosed in calendar year 2011 0) Diagnosed in year≠ 2011
1) Diagnosed in 2011
Complication group at present Complication group at 31st of December 2011 1) CG0
2) CG1
3) CG2
Complication group at diagnosis Complication group at diagnosis 1) CG0
2) CG1
3) CG2
Mortality 2011 Death in 2011 0) Alive 2011
1) Death 2011
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inequality in that costs accumulate among patients with
these morbidity characteristics, who are also those with
the lowest educational level. Among immigrants and
elder (75+), the pattern, however, is opposite with costs
accumulating to a higher extent among the higher in-
come groups.
As shown in Table 4, concentration indices for out-
patient rehabilitation and specialist treatment in primary
care are positive, contrary to the other cost variables.
However, contributions from determinants are not sig-
nificant and thus not illustrated.
Turning to the socioeconomic determinants, especially
the higher income patients are receiving outpatient ser-
vices, whereas the lower income patients are receiving
more inpatient services and services in general practice.
According to patients’ ethnicity, negative regression
coefficients (Table 7 in Appendix), imply that immi-
grants accumulate lower costs than do ethnic Danes.
Given that immigrants have lower incomes (as shown by
the negative concentration indices of Table 7 in Appen-
dix), this observation conflicts with the general observa-
tion of costs being concentrated among low income
groups. However, a potential explanation may be that
costs are relatively more concentrated among the higher
socioeconomic groups of immigrants than is the case for
ethnic Danes. This somewhat surprising tendency, which
is observed for in-patient as well as out-patient care and
for pharmaceuticals, even when all other demographics
and morbidity patterns are taken into account, may be
explained by immigrants experiencing language and cul-
tural barriers hindering them in taking full advantage of
the Danish universal health care system [12].
For labor market affiliation, the pattern is much simi-
lar across cost variables. Especially, being retired con-
tributes highly to the level of inequality with magnitudes
around 20-25% of the predicted inequalities in costs.
Only children and patients under education have lower
costs than patients in job whereas all the other categor-
ies in general incur higher costs, especially early retired.
Turning to age and gender, it can be seen that these also
contribute markedly to inequality. Given that young
people are of better health, it is not surprising that they
generate lower costs, and it is also to be expected that
they have lower incomes, as many of them are studying
or in the beginning of their labor market career. How-
ever, for the elder group, a potential interpretation may
be that elder with low incomes are disfavored with re-
spect to treatment cost.
From differences across the regions, a pattern is seen,
which is also reflected in the level of urbanity, where es-
pecially residents in the country side use less resources
Table 2 Definition of nine health care usage cost components
Cost component Cost unit
Inpatient and outpatient services delivered in Danish hospitals registered
in the National Patient Register divided into the following components:
1) Inpatient services
2) Inpatient services for stays longer than the average patient in this DRG-group
3) Inpatient services for rehabilitation
4) Outpatient services
5) Outpatient services for stays longer than the average patient in this DAGS-group
6) Outpatient services for rehabilitation
Diagnosis Related Grouping (DRG) system and Danish Ambulant
Grouping System (DAGS) tariffs - year 2012 [35].
The DRG-tariff system is developed for administrative purpose
and based on rough average costs across hospitals for specific
diagnostic groups. Excludes interest and depreciation of
buildings and equipment while other overhead costs are
included
Primary care services delivered by general practitioners and privately practicing
specialists such as: dentists, physiotherapists, chiropractors, chiropodists who are
registered in the National Health Service Register divided into the following
components:
1) Services in general practices
2) Services for privately practicing specialists
Reimbursement fees between the National Health Insurance
scheme and private practicing physicians are used as cost units.
General Practitioners are compensated by regions through a
combination of per capita fee (app. 30% of total) and fee for
service (app. 70%) [32]. To reflect this payment scheme in the
unit cost, 43.8% of the fee for service in general practice was
added on top. Overhead costs covered by capitation fee were
hence not distributed across numbers of visits, as would have
been most appropriate, but by resource burden.
Prescribed pharmaceuticals dispensed by Danish pharmacies and registered in the
Danish national prescription register. (Pharmaceuticals consumed in hospitals are
included in DRG-tariffs. Over-the-counter drugs are not included in the statements).
Total sales price includes patient out of pocket payments since
costs of prescribed pharmaceuticals are shared between the
patient and the primary health care sector by a copayment
scheme where patients are reimbursed according to their need.
These costs were aggregated since total costs are measured
regardless of who pays. 20% VAT was subtracted.
Table 3 Patient need for health care, as defined by
complication state classification
Complication group Health statea
Complication group 0 (CG0) Diabetes without registered complications
Complication group 1 (CG1) Moderate or minor complications,
problems with eyes, heart, kidney and
nervous system, minor amputations below
the ancle, bypass operation and some eye
operations
Complication group 2 (CG2)
–
Severe complications: blindness,
amputation above the ancle, severe heart
failure, kidney transplant or dialysis
aICD codes defined for each complication group is given in Table 6 in Appendix
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than patients resident in cities, and where costs are more
concentrated among patients from higher income levels.
Turning to marital status, divorced patients generally
have better income, as indicated by the positive concentra-
tion index (Table 7 in Appendix), and they accumulate
more in-patient services but less pharmaceutical costs and
general practice costs compared to married. The latter cor-
responds well with an expectation of divorced being more
reluctant or hesitating to see a doctor. The former supports
an expectation of divorced patients being in worse condi-
tions when hospitalized and more depending on hospital
care, given lack of care from a spouse at home.
Education as ranking variable
Table 5 mirrors Table 4, just with the nine categories edu-
cational level used as rank variable instead of income.
Likewise, Table 8 Appendix in supplementary materials
mirrors Table 7 in Appendix.
Turning to the regression coefficients (Table 8 in Ap-
pendix), some (although minor) differences across re-
gions are found. Thus, the Capital Region and Zealand
Region have higher costs for in-patient, out-patient, spe-
cial care in primary care and pharmaceuticals than the
three other regions, whereas the opposite is true for ser-
vices in general practice. Overall, this pattern is also
reflected in the level of urbanity, where especially resi-
dents in country side use less resources than patients’
resident in cities, and where costs are more concentrated
among patients from higher income levels. This might
be explained by the Capital region and cities having
more resources to seek up patients and invest in second-
ary prevention efforts targeting all patients also those
Fig. 2 Decomposition of income-related inequality in in-patient care costs
Fig. 1 Concentration index (observed and predicted by determinants) of income-related inequalities in cost outcomes Legend: Ciy = Observed
concentration index for the outcome variable Ciy predicted = Concentration index predicted by the included determinants for the outcome variable
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belonging to lower SES groups, who might be more dif-
ficult to address.
Concentration indices based on educational versus in-
come ranks are shown in Fig. 3. It is seen that costs for
outpatient rehabilitation and specialists in primary care
concentrates among the higher socioeconomic groups,
but with relatively stronger associations when ranking
according to education. This may indicate that educa-
tional level is more decisive than income for usage of
outpatient services, rehabilitation and specialist in pri-
mary care among diabetes patients.
Decomposition of inequality of costs for specialists in
primary care (Fig. 4) shows that especially for women 45+,
residents in the countryside and other regions than the
Capital Region, costs concentrate among higher educated
patients. For early retired and retired, the opposite pattern
is seen with costs concentrating among the lower edu-
cated patients, since these patient groups on average have
lower educational level than patients in job (as indicated
by negative concentration indices in Table 8 in Appendix)
and consume more resources since they are more morbid
(cf. the positive regression coefficients in Table 8 in Ap-
pendix). The same applies for patients with severe compli-
cations and for immigrants. For the latter, the explanation
is, however, reversed, as immigrants have higher educa-
tional level and consume less resources (Table 8 in Ap-
pendix). Therefore, their contribution to inequality is in
the direction of costs accumulating among the lower edu-
cational groups. That immigrants have a higher average
educational level than ethnic Danes is counterintuitive.
One explanation might be that only the highest educated
among immigrants are diagnosed at all, another that the
preventive effect of education is not the same among eth-
nic Danes and immigrants.
Concentrating on ethnicity, the observed pattern for
specialist treatment is likewise observed for all three
types of in-patient care and pharmaceutical usage. For
general practice, the pattern is opposite indicating that
immigrants of lower educational levels have higher usage
of these services than do ethnic Danes (Table 8 in
Appendix).
Turning to morbidity indicators, severe complications
and dead in 2011 generally explain more of income in-
equality than of educational inequality. While between
62 and 97% of income related inequality in costs for in-
patient and out-patient care was explained by having se-
vere complications or dying in 2011, the figures are 25–
45% for educational level. For out-patient care, as much
as 92% of costs accumulating among lower levels of in-
come were explained from these two morbidity indica-
tors. For education on the contrary, as much as 245% of
inequality with costs accumulating among higher edu-
cated are explained from these two morbidity indicators.
For labor market affiliation, similar patterns are ob-
served across the two tables, however with larger magni-
tude of contributions of the determinants for income
inequality than educational inequality. For age and gen-
der, patterns overall agree across the two tables.
Discussion
Based on our study of the population of Danish diabetes
patients, we demonstrate modest inequality in diabetes
patients’ health care and pharmaceutical usage, reflecting
that the Danish universal health care system is generally
not inequitable. Our results, however, indicate that the
amount of inequality explained by patients’ morbidity
patterns varies greatly across type of services showing
different levels of realized access. This corresponds to
previous findings concerning income-related inequality
in health care utilization in Denmark [23]. Types of ser-
vices showing inequality, however, differ from previous
findings, suggesting that different utilization patterns are
Fig. 3 Concentration indices of health care and pharmaceutical usage based on ranking by income and educational level respectively
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at stake within a specific chronic disease area. This indi-
cates a need of disease specific investigations within the
large public health diseases, aiming at informing future
strategic efforts and national guidelines. Results indicate
that patients of higher SES, especially when SES is mea-
sured by educational level, are favored or are more pro-
active in receiving services when they are seriously ill,
and that they likewise are more willing to accept re-
habilitation services and seek specialist care, when diag-
nosed with diabetes. In the Danish health care system,
general practice, which is formed by private practice
physicians serving under a contract with the government
and the regions, serves as gate-keeper with referrals re-
quired for specialist treatment [50], which might be per-
ceived as a barrier. Our findings supplement existing
literature on differences in especially preventive services
and maintenance of life style changes [11]. According to
demographic determinants, results point to higher costs
among higher income groups among immigrants, elder
75+ years and residents in outer areas. For immigrants,
this finding illustrate lower realized access, which along
with the findings concerning morbidity in this group
stress the importance of reducing the barriers for these
patient groups for fully taking advantage of the Danish
health care system. Our results demonstrate that con-
founding is present between income and selected char-
acteristics, in particular age, labor market attachment
and diabetes complications, and that attention must be
paid to these by properly controlling for them, as is done
in the above regression. Also, given the potential endo-
geneity between income and labor market attachment
(in the sense that labor market affiliation is a potential
outcome of income), it is recommendable to either sub-
stitute or supply with analyses using education rather
than income as measure of SES status. However, while
lifestyle factors are not accounted for in the study, edu-
cation may not be a fully true SES measure and thus not
“fairly” compared to income as SES.
The present study does not investigate how to change in-
equality components, however, it does show where the lar-
gest potentials for socio-economic related inequality
reduction lie, thus providing an important basis for future
research and efforts to reduce inequality in diabetes and in
health as such. Given marked prevalence increase in dia-
betes in Denmark as well as globally [21, 51], our findings
indicate that inequality in diabetes will also increase. This
only stresses the importance of recognition and prioritizing
of inequality aspects within chronic disease and diabetes.
The study adds empirical insights regarding choice of
proxy for SES. Important differences of applying income
and education as proxy for patients’ SES are noted,
which may be ascribed to endogeneity of income, i.e.,
that income, alike other measures of labor market at-
tachment, to a certain extent is determined by morbid-
ity. Our results indicate that education is more decisive
than income for patients’ realized access. Hence, educa-
tion as rank variable might be preferable in analyses of
utilization patterns. Application of both education and
income, however, may be recommended since the two
enables a more nuanced and comprehensive understand-
ing of results. Furthermore, when using education as
proxy for SES, several reservations remain as discussed
by inter alia Cutler and Lleras-Muney [9] and Cuther et
al. (2011). One reservation regards as to whether there is
Fig. 4 Decomposition of education related inequality in costs for specialists in primary care
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a direct link or merely indirect links via for example life-
style, which correlates with education. Furthermore, the
health effect of an additional year of schooling may be
far from constant. Also, the effect of age at educational
attainment is pointed out: The lower age at educational
attainment, the lower effect of education on health later
in life, given that one should expect a diminishing effect
of education over the lifespan. The education effect on
health may also vary with gender and ethnicity. Finally,
unobserved matters like genetic conditions or other in-
tergenerational patterns are pointed out by the authors.
For example, children from low SES families may have
less educational outcome on health.
There are certain limitations of the study, which should
be noticed. Data on patients’ need evaluated from a phys-
ician or self-assessed by the patient would enhance the
study, as would data on patients’ life style choices. Next,
since diabetes is highly influenced by risky health behav-
iour [36], observed associations might to a certain degree
be explained by life style choices [37]. Furthermore, in our
regressions, we chose not to include interactions aiming
at easing interpretation of results. Also, in the concentra-
tion index calculations, tied ranking was applied within
each educational level. This might potentially bias results
as compared to what would be obtained by a continuous
outcome variable. This was investigated by Clarke and
Van Ourti [8], who included income level as an approxi-
mation for a ranking variable within each of the educa-
tional categories. Our results indicate downward as well
as upward impacts of applying a grouped rank variable as
compared to a continuous variable. Mainly, we find that
the grouped variable underestimates the concentration in-
dices. For outpatient care we find that the sign shifts from
positive to negative. The concentration index for out-
patient care was only significant on a 10% level. The re-
sults of Clarke and Van Ourti indicated the largest impact
of grouped ranking variable in cases where the concentra-
tion index was insignificant. This might indicate that the
positive sign for outpatient care can be questioned, how-
ever, the positive sign for ambulant rehabilitation remains
with all ranking variables. Furthermore, it should be noted
that while we use patients’ personal income as a conveni-
ent measure of the individual SES, household income
(equivalized for household composition) may alternatively
be applied as a measure of the full economic capacity of
the patient. While the latter summarizes the SES of the
household, assuming the SES of the patient to be equal to
the SES of the household, the former may be more ad-
equate for more complex household compositions. Any-
way, we appreciate that inclusion of household income
rather than individual income would more precisely ex-
press the economic ability of the patient.
Finally, it should be noted that the methodology behind
the study, was developed in the early 2000s [43, 44, 48].
Since then, different authors suggested alternative ap-
proaches to address certain aspects. Thus, corrections to
the concentration index were suggested by Wagstaff [46]
and Errygers [15]. Wagstaff showed that that the upper and
lower bounds of a binary variable whose inequality is inves-
tigated depend on the mean of this variable, while Errygers
showed that this is the case for any variable with bounds.
Thus, when a health variable has bounds, the concentration
index will depend on the mean, and comparisons between
populations with different health means therefore become
problematic. Other methods considering that socio-
economic inequality is bivariate by nature and measuring
the correlation between health and socio-economic status
were suggested by Erreygers and Kessels [16], Kessels and
Errygers [28], and Erreygers and Kessels [17]. To these,
Heckley et al. [24] added a Recentered Influence Function
(RIF) regression approach, where a two-dimensional de-
composition of determinants of health as well as of deter-
minants of the socio-economic variable (income in the
present paper), together with a feed-back between these
two, was suggested. Furthermore, the choice of concentra-
tion index involves a value judgement as discussed by e.g.
Allanson and Paetrie [2] and Kjellson et al. [30]. Thus, a
choice must be made between absolute and relative mea-
sures, and between measures of health or ill-health in case
the index has both a lower and an upper bound. As shown
by van Doorslaer and Koolman [42] and Clarke et al. [7],
the choice of index can influence the ranking.
Conclusion
Even in a universal health care system, our results, which
are based on the population of Danish diabetes patients,
indicate differences in realized access with patients of
higher SES, especially higher educational level, to a lar-
ger extent enjoying offers of especially out-patient ser-
vices, rehabilitation and specialists in primary care.
Health care usage of patients of lower SES hereby not al-
ways corresponds to their need. Especially elder people,
divorced, people outside the labour market and immi-
grants are vulnerable when belonging to lower SES
groups and would benefit from being targeted directly.
Results indicate that different utilization patterns are at
stake within a specific chronic disease as diabetes, com-
pared to general health care utilization patterns. Meth-
odologically, our findings underpin important
differences of using income and educational level, re-
spectively, as proxy for SES. Our results indicate that
education is more decisive than income for patients’ re-
alized access whereas income-related inequality in health
care usage to a higher extent is explained by morbidity.
Several of these findings may underpin universal struc-
tures behind inequality in diabetes, and in chronic dis-
ease in general, which are valuable beyond the specific
case of Denmark.
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Appendix
Table 6 Grouping of diagnoses and interventions used for classifying hospital activities by complication states of relevance for diabetes,
and with respect to diagnostic specificity for diabetes
Diagnosis or procedure Qualifying for complication statea Specificity for diabetesb
Diabetes in pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium 0 1
Diabetes, without indication of chronic complication 0 1
Hypoglycaemiccoma NOS 0 0
Screening for diabetic retinopathy 0 1
Drug treatment or instruction specific for diabetes 0 1
Acute myocardial infarction 1 0
Diabetes with complication, not further specified 1 1
Diabetes with complications in peripheral vascular system 1 1
Diabetes with eye complication 1 1
Diabetes with footulcer 1 1
Diabetes with microangiopathy 1 1
Diabetes with neurological complication 1 1
Diabetes with peripheral angiopathy 1 1
Diabetes with renal complication 1 1
Diabetic cataract 1 1
Diabetic polyneuropathy 1 1
Diabetic retinopathy not otherwise specified 1 1
Diseases of the lens 1 0
Polyneuropathy 1 0
Proliferative diabetic retinopathy 1 1
Uraemia 1 0
Simplex diabetic retinopathy 1 1
Cataract, retinopathy in diabetes 1 1
Diabetic angiopathy in extremities 1 1
Diabetic nephropathy, Kimmelstiel-Wilson syndrom 1 1
Neuropathy, diabetic polyneuritis, diabetes 1 1
Amputation at or below ankle level 1 0
Coronary bypass operation 1 0
Surgery for eye complication 1 0
Teatment of ulcer of lower limb 1 0
Diabetes with gangraene 2 1
Diabetes with multiple complications 2 1
Diabetic maculopathy 2 1
Dialysis 2 0
Diseases of the retina 2 0
Heart failure 2 0
Kidney transplantation 2 0
Renalfailure 2 0
Stroke 2 0
Blindness 2 0
Diabetic gangraene 2 1
Gangrena of lower limb 2 0
Intracerebral haemorrhage 2 0
Amputation above ankle level 2 0
aValue indicates classification state (0, 1 or 2, respectively)
bValues 1 and 0 indicate that item is specific for diabetes and unspecific for diabetes, respectively
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